The combination of the digitalization of cultural goods and facilitated cross-border availability through the internet fuels a globalization process that is often said to cause a homogenization of demand across countries, in particular, for entertainment goods as music and movies. In the markets for music, this implies that the same hits and the same artists should be popular across countries and cultures. . I gratefully acknowledge financial support from FAZIT-Stiftung.
In order to test this hypothesis, we analyze historical voting data of the Eurovision Song Contest, the worldwide biggest live broadcasted international music competition between all countries of the European Broadcasting Union. It covers the period from 1975-2016 where digitalization and internet availability were invented and evolved into mass phenomena. Consequently, according to the outlined theory of homogenization of preferences, voting should have become more concentrated on the leading artists and less focused on regional differences in taste. For the purpose of detecting concentration trends in the points allocation, we employ different indicators for measuring concentration. First, we calculate a concentration ratio, representing the accumulated total number of points of the top three, five and ten-placed countries in each year of the contest. Second, we calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI) and, third, the Gini-Coefficient for each year. Furthermore, we test trendlines for statistical significance. The results show, that our analysis cannot support the thesis of preference homogenization. We find no significant trend towards preference convergence. In contrast, some of the employed indicators and methods point towards significant, albeit weak, deconcentration trends in voting behavior for the contest.
Introduction
In the modern digital online world, songs, movies, e-books, fashion and websites reach the recipients worldwide within few seconds. The video-sharing website YouTube has nearly 900 million unique visits every month (YouTube 2015, Statistic Brain Research Institute), people watch the same television shows (à la television talent contests like Pop Idol or The X Factor), wear the same cloths and eat the same (fast) food. In the literature, this trend of global cultural convergence across industries is also known as "McDonaldization" (Ritzer 1993) . The term does not exclusively focus on the fast food restaurant. It serves as a metaphor for an -alleged -effect of globalization that is further fueled by digitalization and the widespread availability of broadband internet: a convergence of tastes and lifestyles away from local traditions and towards standardized and homogenized consumption patterns worldwide.
More economically phrased, the combination of the digitalization of cultural goods and facilitated cross-border availability through the internet fuels a globalization process that is often said to cause a homogenizing trend on preferences, for instance, for entertainment goods (music, movies, etc.) but also for food, fashion and so on, manifesting in a homogenization of demand across countries (Esmer 2006; Jurgenson 2010; Ferreira & Waldfogel 2013; George & Peukert 2014) . This, in turn, should promote market convergence: according to the cultural convergence hypothesis, the topsellers will be the same everywhere and international superstars and international superstar products will gain at the expense of local heroes. In the markets for music, this implies that the same superhits and the same superstar artists should be the favorites of the audience across countries and cultures. As such, the convergence process translates into a concentration process where the same group of global superstars leads the market everywhere instead of a kaleidoscope of local heroes. The pro-concentration effect should be even stronger, if the process of digitalization and internet availability is accompanied by trade liberalization and economic integration.
In order to test this hypothesis, we analyze voting data from the Eurovision Song Contest, a music competition where artists from European countries compete for votes from the participating countries. As the EBU Director General Ingrid Deltenre puts it: "60 years ago the first Eurovision Song Contest was held with the aim of bringing nations together. Music knows no national boundaries and provides a common language for us all. The friendships formed between the competing artists from over 40 nations come through the screen to audiences watching at home. The fact that the Eurovision Song Contest is so popular in an increasingly polarized world illustrates that the differences are smaller than we think". 1 This competition has a 60
year history, spanning from 1956 to 2016 (and ongoing). Thus, it covers the period in time where digitalization and internet availability were invented and evolved into mass phenomena. Furthermore, economic integration has significantly proceeded in Europe through this time period as well. Consequently, according to the outlined theory of homogenization of preferences and consequently demand, voting should have become more concentrated on the leading artists and songs in the course of time. Instead of national differences in preferences and taste, voters and experts from different European countries should have converged in their choices. This is highlighted by comments like the following example after the 2015 edition of the contest suspecting this mechanism at work: "The same problem occurred this time.
There were a string of favorites who got all the votes. Hence, nothing was left for the bottom half of the ranking, the places 13 to 27. That is why we [Germany] are sitting on the bottom of the table. The distribution of points has just been different" (Urban 2015). 2 In the context of the overall talk, the commentator, a long-time and well-respected expert of the Eurovision Song Contest, put up two hypotheses: (i) the voting behavior in 2015 has concentrated on the same few favorites across all countries, so that they received a larger share of the total points than usual, and (ii) this is an ongoing trend, i.e. the share of the points for the favorites is increasing over time. However, does the claimed increasing concentration on the top performers actually take place? In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the development of the concentration of points allocated to the top performers. We employ a set of different indicators for measuring concentrations, namely simple concentration ratios, the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI), and the Gini Coefficient. Furthermore, econometric techniques are used to detect concentration trends in the voting data of the Eurovision Song Contest. However, our analysis cannot support the hypothesis of cultural preferences homogenization: the employed indicators and methods do not reveal a significant pro-concentration trend in the market of the contest. On the contrary, the majority of the employed indicators and methods indicate significant deconcentration trends in the market of the contest. In general, the magnitude and level of concentration is very low.
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section reviews earlier studies in the literature focusing on the topic of convergence and homogenization of cultural preferences. Section three and four form the main part, containing descriptive analysis of points allocation, the different indicators for measuring concentration, the econometric analysis and its empirical results. The paper concludes with a discussion of our results in section five. There are only very few empirical studies on convergence and homogenization in media and cultural economics so far. George and Peukert (2014) and Ferreira and Waldfogel (2013) are thematically closely related. They study the topic of whether trade and current technology replace local culture and local music. George and Peukert (2014) deal with the question whether the lower costs of exchanging cultural goods lead to a homogenization trend of demand in the market for music. If there is a convergence trend in music, same international music-hits should take the same leading chart positions across the countries. George and Peukert (2014) put their empirical research on the role of the video-sharing website YouTube, which was established in 2005. In order to prove, they investigate the change of weekly matches of the number of songs and artists on the market for popular music across Germany, Austria and the US from 2002 until 2013 by also focusing on the Youtube ban in 2009 (videos were blocked by a contract dispute only in Germany). Generally, they find that the presence of YouTube increases the number of US hits on the single charts in Europe, which may be interpreted as pointing towards more convergence.
Literature Review

Previous Research on Cultural Convergence
Furthermore, their data displays an increase of the speed of the hit cycle in the YouTube age. However, George and Peukert (2014) conclude, despite the introduction of YouTube, there is still a high demand for domestic music. They stress the fact that "although we find that the net impact of the YouTube platform is to widen the reach of international hits, the magnitude of estimated effects are modest, suggesting that YouTube will not drive out the market for local artists" (George and Peukert 2014: 19) .
Likewise, Ferreira and Waldfogel (2013) focus their study on the convergence of tastes for worldwide hits in the market for music. They use a unique dataset on music charts that corresponds over 98 % of the global market for popular music in order to offer details about the demand of global music and their trade since 1960 until 2007. Their collected 1,202,554 chart entries that cover 68,283 songs and a number of 23,377 artists from 22 countries. Inter alia, they could not find a connection between the growth of communication channels (MTV and Internet) and the simultaneous decrease of domestic music consumption. They also find, against the presumption of US dominance in the world entertainment industry, that music trade is approximately proportional to countries' GDPs and that even smaller countries have a larger proportional share of trade than the US. Their "(…) findings suggest that concern about cultural domination by large economies -particularly the US -is misplaced for music" (Ferreira and Waldfogel 2013: 30) .
Our paper adds to the literature by analyzing a live music event where audience in dozens of countries watches the same performances and vote for their favorite performances. Furthermore, the participating countries predominantly come from Europe, so that the process of cultural convergence should be particularly strong due to (relatively) close geographic proximity. Thus, it is interesting to analyze whether this unique setting yields the convergence trends that the literature struggles to identify in broader contexts.
The Eurovision Song Contest
We choose the annual Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) as relevant example for testing our hypothesis, because music is said to be the most probable potential source of (cultural) convergence (Cheng et al. 2008 ). Furthermore, the whole historical voting data of the ESC is available, it covers the period in time where digitalization and internet availability were invented and it always takes place at the same time once a year (in spring).
Nowadays, the ESC is one of the most successful and longest-living international music competitions and television shows worldwide. At the same time, it is the world's largest entertainment broadcast with around 200 million international viewers. The main aim of this contest is to "promote high-quality original songs in the field of popular music, by encouraging competition among artists, songwriters and composers through the international comparison of their songs" (EBU/UER 2013). In the end of the contest, populations of the participating countries (in fluctuating combinations of expert juries and audience voting) vote for the performances that each participating country represent, however, they must not vote for their own country.
In 2015, the Eurovision Song Contest has been awarded a Guinness World Record for the "World's Longest Running Annual TV Music Competition", because it has as the only television show successfully bringing nations together for a remarkable period of 6 decades 3 . Additionally, one year later (2016) it has also been awarded the "The Charlemagne Medal for European Media" (médaille charlemagne pour les médias européens), which is a European media award. It honors personalities or institutions within the field of the media that have supported the development of European unity and a creation of a European identity in a special way. 4
The first Song Contest (former Grand Prix Eurovision) took place in Lugano on the 24th of May, 1956. However, initially only seven nations participated. 5 All active Members (56 countries) of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) are invited to take part in the ESC. Although membership is not restricted to European countries, for instance, Morocco, Israel and Australia participated in the contest in the past.
Still, its geographical reach predominantly covers Europe. However, due to geographical proximity and supporting factors like an advanced economic integration, the contest offers a particularly striking example: if homogenization trends occur, they should be visible in the ESC.
In the past years, the details of the voting system were frequently modified. The current system of scoring, the so called "douze points"-voting-system, was introduced in 1975 and is based upon every country creating its own ranking of the top 10 performances. The participant who obtains the highest number of votes within a country, receives twelve points, the second place will be rewarded with ten and the third place with eight points. The performers of the seven following ranks receive decreasingly seven to one point. Nine and eleven points are not awarded. Expectedly, the winner of the contest is finally the country having received the highest total number of points. After qualification through semi-final systems and other criteria, a max- (2009) as well as Budzinski and Pannicke (2016). 7 However, to our best knowledge, none of the papers has dealt with concentration trends.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
In our paper, we perform an empirical study, comparing different indicators measuring concentration trends in points allocation in the Eurovision Song Contest. Therefore, we gather the historical voting data set of the ESC from 1975-2016. 8 An official committee publishes the voting outcomes each year. The results of the voting illustrate the total number of points each partaking country received in the contest. We collect the years 1975-2016 (inclusive) for our data analysis because there were no changes of the "douze points"-voting-system since its introduction in 1975. In total, 7 Other relevant papers include, inter alia, Haan et al. (2005) , Clerides and Stengos (2006) , Yair (1995) . 8 See http://www.eurovision.tv. 954 times countries received points throughout the investigated period. All participating countries who received points throughout our sample are listed in Table 1 .
Here you can find the number of times each country participated (Year), the points' standard deviation, the mean points awarded per country over all partaking years as well as their minimum and maximum points in total of a year. Austria, for example, receives around 50 points on average over a period of 31 years. Denmark likewise participated 31 times but with higher points on average, more precisely with points of 75 on average. Denmark received at minimum 5 points in a contest, their maximum number of receiving points were 281. 
Concentration in the Voting Market of the ESC
Concentration Ratios, HHI and Gini Coefficient
In case of a homogenizing trend on preferences and culture convergence, the con-test´s point allocations should have become more concentrated on the leading artists over the investigated period. Conversely, that means regional differences should have become less concentrated over time. In order to measure and compare the different points allocations from the beginning of the "douze points" system in 1975 until 2016, we work with three different measures.
First, we calculate the concentration ratio, which is usually used in economics to measure the concentration of market shares in a distinct market. If a market or an industry is dominated by a small number of large firms, the value of the concentration ratio is high, which means stronger concentration power and (more often than not) less competition, and vice versa. The concentration ratio is calculated by the sum of the market shares of the largest n firms in the market. In our study, we employ this indicator in order to measure the "market share" of the top n performers in the "market for votes", expressed by the points allocation "market for points". We measure the share of points (= market share) won by the top 3 (CR-3), top 5 (CR-5), and top 10 (CR-10) participating countries for each year of the contest. If there is a trend of homogenization and a pro-concentration effect, the accumulated share of the top three-, five-and ten-placed countries should increase, i.e. the top three-, five-and ten-placed of later years score continuously more points compared to those top three, five and ten-placed of earlier years. For example, for calculating the CR-5 concentration ratio, we sum the percentage of points share owned by the top 5 participating countries with the highest number of points, where P1 is the country with the highest amount of points (the winner of the contest), P2 the second-placed, P3 the third-placed and so forth. M is the total number of all distributed points within a contest in year t.
A significant rise of concentration ratios indicates an increase of preference homogenization. Since concentration ratios do not take into consideration all market shares of firms (or in our case: participants) in a particular market, they may represent a biased picture of concentration. Furthermore and due to the fact that the value of the CR may also be biased as the number of participating countries in the final increase, we additionally calculate HHI for measuring concentration.
Thus, we secondly calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI; named after economists Orris C. Herfindahl 1950 and Albert O. Hirschman 1945 , 1964 for each year, which focuses on all firms in an industry and therefore captures imbalances and variations within all firms in a particular market. Because of its main advantage, the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index is a widespread accepted measurement of market concentration in industrial economics and competition law (inter alia Borenstein 1989 , Evans & Kesides 1993 , Gilbert 1984 , Sulivan 1985 Sumner 1981) . It measures the sum of squared market share of all firms competing in that particular market. The value of the HHI ranges from zero to 10,000. The higher the value of the HHI, the higher is market concentration. In antitrust economics, HHI values above 2500 imply highly concentrated markets. Moderately concentrated markets are characterized through values between 1500 and 2500. 9 We convert the HHI into an indicator of preference homogenization for the ESC by looking at each country's share of points of each contest since 1975. Thus, the index measures the sum of the quadratic share of points won by each country in a contest in year t. Consequently, we calculate the HHI as:
where MS i is the market share of country i in year t and N is the number of participating countries receiving points in the contest. A significant rise of HHI indicates an increase of preference homogenization and therefore a decline in heterogeneity of demand across countries. Note that we are only interested in the change of the HHI from year to year. We do not interpret the level of the HHI (like in antitrust economics).
A third concentration measure is the so-called Gini-coefficient, developed by Corrado Gini. It is mostly known in economics for its application for measuring income or wealth distribution (inter alia, Lambert 1993). However, it is also used for other purposes, for instance, Schmidt and Berri (2001) use Gini-coefficients to measure competitive balance in sports leagues. We adapt the indicator for measuring the homogenization trend in the ESC. As a measure of statistical distribution, the Gini-coefficient is used to point out inequalities. Consequently, values between one and zero are determined. In general, the values are expressed as percentages. The closer the calculated value is to zero, the more balanced and equal is the distribution of the points among all countries. A higher Gini-coefficient indicates that the votes concentrate on just a few participating countries. Values closer to one suggest a contest 9 For instance, these classifications are used by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. See https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index with a few countries that spread most of the points. Thus, high values signal market concentration and a decline in heterogeneity across countries
We define the Gini-coefficient as:
where n represents the number of evaluated countries in year t and x j the total number of points per country in year t.
When applying these concentration measures, we have to consider that they may be biased to the changing number of participants in the Eurovision Song Contest. Appendix should be less sensitive because of its emphasis on the higher shares. In order to get an indication whether this problem is relevant for our analysis, we tested for statistical correlations in order to see if there is a relationship between the changings of participating countries in the final and the changings of our measures from one year to another. We could not find any significant correlations between the difference of the number of participating countries (∆Part.) and the ones of the applied indicators ∆HHI, ∆CR 3, ∆CR 5 and ∆CR 10 . Only ∆Gini-coefficient is significantly correlated to the difference of the number of participants on a significance level of 0.05 (5%) (see appendix tables 2 and 3). However, Gini shows an increasing concentration with the increase in participation. Altogether, we derive confidence that the increasing number of participants does not counterbalance a possible pro-concentration effect. 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Concentration Ratio CR 3 CR 5 CR 10 points in the direction of lower concentration and therefore an increase of heterogeneity of demand across countries -with 2015 perhaps representing an outlier.
Concentration Trends in the ESC?
Accordingly, the market share of the top countries receiving points has seemingly not increased.
Figure 2: HHI of the ESC points allocation from 1975-2016
We can see the same picture with the Gini-coefficient ( 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 HHI Index 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 
Gini-Coeffizient
From looking at the standard concentration measures in economics, we cannot support the hypothesis of a longer-run or midterm pro-concentration trend in the ESC market of points. The development is rather characterized by continuous fluctuations with some years displaying a stronger concentration of votes across Europe towards the top and others the opposite. However, the year 2015 indeed appears to be a year with an exceptionally high concentration of votes on the top performers.
Econometrics -Methods and Results
To formally test whether a linear trend occurs, we run a set of time series regression with a time trend as the independent variable. Accordingly, we define as the dependent variable (1):
where represents the concentration ratio (CR3, CR5 and CR10), HHI and Gini-Coefficient, β 1i t the independent variable time (measured in years) and ε t,i the corresponding error term.
In order to see whether a trend exists, a time series regression model was estimated.
The following figures show the results of running a regression of CR, HHI and Gini-Coefficient against time with an assumed linear trend. In general, the results from our linear trend model do not confirm the results by George and Peukert (2014) to the extent that a homogenization trend of preferences can be show significantly.
Figure 4: Linear Regression Trendline Using Least Squares -CR, 1975-2016
No significant trend occurs in the data of CR-3. The concentration ratio rise and fall with no particular pattern. On the contrary, a significant trend occurs when looking at concentration ratios representing the accumulated total number of point´s share of the five-and ten-placed countries in each year of the contest. CR-5 shows a significant negative trendline on a one-star level, while CR-10 decrease significantly on a three-star level (see table 2 ). Therefore, we cannot find a pro-concentration effect.
On the contrary, the employment of concentration ratios suggests a trend towards a lower concentration during the period of time, i.e., a heterogenization of tastes. 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Concentration Ratios CR 3 CR 5 CR 10 Linear (CR 3) Linear (CR 5) Linear (CR 10)
Figure 5: Linear Regression Trendline Using Least Square -HHI, 1975-2016
When looking at the trendline of the HHI, we find a linear function with a negative slope ( figure 5 ). This equation shows that during the sample period, the HHI of voting significantly decreases by an average of 3.54 per year. Again, the hypothesis of a homogenization trend is rejected. In contrast, a significant deconcentration is derived. In contrast to the other concentration measures, the trendline of the Gini-coefficient displays a trend towards more concentration of the points allocation ( figure 6 ). This would imply support for the hypothesis of cultural convergence. However, the trend is not significant. 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 HHI Index HHI Index Linear (HHI Index) y = 0,0011x + 0,3997 R² = 0,0491 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 70% 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Gini-Coefficient 
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Comparison of Concentration Trends before and after the introduction of
Televoting in 1998
The ESC consists of two different groups of voters: (i) music experts and music industry representatives form national juries, and (ii) the television audience votes directly via various telecommunication channels. During the years, the voting system and the weight of the votes between those two groups has changed. In the literature on ESC voting behavior, there is indication that juries and the audience differ in their voting behavior with respect to voting biases (inter alia, Haan et al. 2005; Clerides and Stengos 2006; Spierdijk and Vellekoop 2009) . Although it has not been analyzed so far, expert juries and audiences may also be affected by cultural convergence to different degrees and extents. Notwithstanding, it is implausible to claim that one of the two groups -expert juries and audience -is not subject to the forces of cultural convergence at all. Still, if the influence differs in extent, our analysis may underestimate a possible homogenization trend when using the different indicators without looking separately at different voting regimes. From 1975 until 1997, there was no audience voting and all points were allocated by expert juries, whereas from 1998 until 2016 either both juries and audience voted (with equal weight) or only televoting determined the points allocation (the latter in only few years from 1998 to 2008).
Consequently, we separated our dataset into two samples in order to detect differences due to the major regime change. 1975-1997 748,85462 33,378235 49,63866 78,13100 0,40913043 20,913044 1215,478 1998-2016 688,641493 32,717530 47,695795 73,53244 0,44157895 24,842105 2164,316 Looking at the concentration ratios ( figure 7 and 8) , there seem to be very little differences between the two regimes. In other words, the introduction of audience voting did not speed up a convergence process. Predominantly, the oscillations seem to have increased with audience voting. 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Concentration Ratios Jury Voting CR 3 CR 5 CR 10 Linear (CR 3) Linear (CR 5) Linear (CR 10) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Concentration Ratios Jury + Audience Voting (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) CR 3 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 HHI Index Jury + Audience Voting (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) Employing the HHI again shows very little differences. Quite in contrast to the convergence hypothesis, the concentration appears to be decreasing with the introduction of the audience voting. This may indicate the audience is less prone to cultural convergence than expert juries. Again, fluctuations increase after the introduction of audience voting. 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Gini-Coefficient Jury + Audience Voting (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) the hypothesis of cultural convergence. However, the trend can only be seen when focusing the trendline of expert juries on a significance level of 0.05 (5%) ( 
Discussion and Implications
The combination of globalization, digitalization and the widespread availability of broadband internet is often believed to cause a convergence of tastes and preferences across countries and cultures, in particular regarding entertainment products (cultural convergence hypothesis). We contribute to the empirical analysis of this topic by analyzing voting data from the Eurovision Song Contest, a competition of popular music, where each country presents a song and expert juries and the audience from all countries vote for their favorite performances. According to the cultural convergence hypothesis, votes should concentrate in the course of time on the same hit performances, leading to an increased concentration of points on the side of top positions -in contrast to a rather even distribution of points among the participants.
Both representatives of the ESC organizers and long-standing experts of the contest have expressed that according to their perception this convergence or concentration process takes place (see section 1). In order to review these assessments, we apply three different concentration measures -concentration ratios, the HHI, and the Gini coefficient -and test for significant time trends.
Altogether, our empirical analysis of the points allocation development in the ESC during the last four decades does not support the hypothesis of preference convergence. None of the employed measures displays a significant increase in the concentration of points on the top positions. Only the Gini coefficient yields a positive sign, indicating an increase in concentration. However, it is not significant, in particular not for the time period after 1998. Consequently, we find no indication that the pop music tastes of the citizens of European countries converge in the course of time along with the ongoing process of digitalization and internationalization of (internet-based) music platforms (video streaming, legal and illegal downloading, audio streaming, etc.). To that regard, the observation of ESC experts cannot be substantiated by our empirical research.
Quite in contrast to the convergence hypothesis, we find that some measures display a significant trend towards a deconcentration of the points allocation, i.e. towards a heterogenization of tastes and preferences. CR5, CR10 and the HHI significantly decrease over time. However, we remain cautious about interpreting this trend. On the one hand, even though it is significant, it does not appear to be a strong trend taking place on a very deconcentrated level. On the other hand, the increasing number of participants in the contest may be the main driving-force for this deconcentration trend. Furthermore, if we isolate the period from 1998-2016 where audience voting influences the results, the econometric model does not display considerable explanatory power.
Whereas we cannot support the convergence hypothesis, we do find support for the claim that 2015 was a year with a particular strong concentration of points on the top performers. All the measures we employed display the year 2015 as belonging to the top 3 most concentrated years in the history of the contest. However, this appears to be an outlier rather than a systematic effect. 
